Bonnie M. Meguid

Publications and Working Papers

Publications

Party Competition between Unequals: Strategies and Electoral Fortunes in Western Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008. Abstract

“Issue Salience, Issue Ownership, and Issue-Based Vote Choice” (co-authored with Éric Bélanger),

Electoral Studies, 27 (September 2008): 477-91.

Abstract: According to the issue ownership theory of voting, voters identify the political party that they feel is the most competent, or the most credible, proponent of a particular issue and cast their ballots for that issue owner. Yet the actual micro-level mechanism of such behavior has seldom been examined in the literature. We explore the mechanism and, in the process, offer a refinement to the original model of issue ownership. We argue that, while party ownership of an issue is important to vote choice, its effect is mediated by the perceived salience of the issue in question. Through individual-level analyses of vote choice in the 1997 and 2000 Canadian federal elections, we demonstrate that issue ownership affects the voting decisions of only those individuals who think that the issue is salient. These findings suggest that salience should be more explicitly integrated into the formulation and testing of the theory.

“Competition Between Unequals: The Role of Mainstream Party Strategy in Niche Party Success.” American Political Science Review, 99.3(August 2005): 347-59.

Abstract: What accounts for variation in the electoral success of niche parties? Although institutional and sociological explanations of single-issue party strength have been dominant, they tend to remove parties from the analysis. In this article, I argue that the behavior of mainstream parties influences the electoral fortunes of the new, niche party actors. In contrast to standard spatial theories, my theory recognizes that party tactics work by altering the salience and ownership of issues for political competition, not just party issue positions. It follows that niche party support can be shaped by both proximal and non-proximal competitors. Analysis of green and radical right party vote in 17 Western European countries from 1970 to 2000 confirms that mainstream party strategies matter; the modified spatial theory accounts for the failure and success of niche parties across countries and over time better than institutional, sociological and even standard spatial explanations.

Book Review of Marcus Kreuzer’s Institutions and Innovation: Voters, Parties, and Interest Groups in the Consolidation of Democracy – France and Germany, 1870-1939, Comparative Political Studies, 35.6(2002): 744-48.

Working Papers

“Decentralization: An Institutional Strategy of Appeasement.” Under Review

Abstract: The adoption of decentralizing reforms across Western Europe over the last thirty years prompts questions about why and when national governments transfer significant political and fiscal powers to subnational authorities. Contributing to the growing literature on the origins of institutions, this paper views decentralization as an electoral strategy. However unlike existing strategic explanations which focus solely on these reforms as means, I argue that decentralization is both a means and a desirable policy ends. It is a tool to strengthen the national-level electoral strength of the governing parties by appeasing regionalist challengers and their voters. By conceiving of decentralization in this manner, we can understand why parties would propose devolution reforms that would sabotage their control of the newly created subnational bodies. I illustrate the power of the policy appeasement theory by examining intranational variation in the degree and timing of decentralizing reforms in the regions of the United Kingdom.

“The Critical Role of Non-Proximal Parties in Electoral Competition: Evidence from France.” Chapter in the volume, Politics Through the Lens of Parties, ed. John Coleman. Book Manuscript Under Review

Abstract: A spatial approach has long dominated theories of party behavior and political competition. However, recent findings on the importance of issue salience and ownership for a party’s electoral success introduce the possibility of non-positional conceptions of party strategy. Based on this observation, I construct a modified spatial theory of party interaction in which parties manipulate electoral support by shifting the salience and ownership of new issues for political competition. Consequently, competition is no longer restricted to ideologically-proximal parties; non-proximal parties play a critical role in determining the electoral fortunes of other actors. An examination of party competition in France and its effect on the electoral trajectory of the Front National confirms these claims. The phenomenal success of the French radical right party is a result, not of the weak accommodative tactics of the proximal RPR, but rather of the timely adversarial strategies of the distant PS.

“Bringing Government Back to the People? The Impact of Political Decentralization on Voter Engagement.”

Abstract: This paper examines how political decentralization has affected levels of voter engagement across Western Europe. Political actors have often justified processes of political decentralization as means to “bring government back to the people”. While these claims are consistent with scholarly theories on voter turnout, aggregate-level analysis does not reveal the expected net shifts in voter attitudes and behavior in decentralized countries. Rather than signaling the relative unimportance of constitutional reform for voter engagement, this study finds that decentralization differentially affects members of the electorate. Using survey data to examine pre and post-decentralization voter participation in Scotland, I determine that partisans of the regionalist, Scottish National Party are more receptive to the effects of this institutional change than affiliates of the national, mainstream parties. This paper suggests, therefore, that institutions do not necessarily have an independent effect on voter behavior; their impact is mediated by the individual-level characteristics of those voters.

“Endogenous Institutions: The Origins of Compulsory Voting Laws.” (co-authored with Gretchen Helmke)

Abstract: Between 1862 and 1998, 33 countries adopted compulsory voting laws, the majority in Western Europe and Latin America.  Although there is a broad literature on the effects of compulsory voting on voter turnout, far less is known about when and why compulsory voting has been adopted.  Using an original cross-national dataset on compulsory voting laws, we find evidence that strategic considerations – whether parties believe they will benefit or be harmed electorally under compulsory voting rules – shape the decisions to adopt such laws. More generally, our paper aims to contribute to the emerging literature on the adoption of electoral systems (e.g., Boix 1999; Benoit 2004; Andrews and Jackman 2005) by examining the degree to which electoral institutions are the result of party strategy and, thus, are endogenous to party competition.

If you wish to get in touch with me, you can email me at bonnie.meguid@rochester.edu

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