Abstract
Terrence Horgan and Mark Timmons argue that any version of moral realism consistent with philosophical naturalism will suffer from a Moral Twin Earth argument. In this paper, I consider two recent arguments against their position. I then offer an alternative response. I argue that alternatives to moral realism are subject to a parallel Amoral Twin Earth argument. It should be apparent that Twin Earth thought experiments simply cannot settle the debate between realists and anti-realists.

NOTE: I presented this paper at the Pacific APA 2004. I would greatly appreciate any comments or suggestions.

Privileged Access, Externalism, and Ways of Believing
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Abstract
Content Externalism is the thesis that the contents of our thoughts are partly determined by external factors. Privileged Access is the thesis that we can know a priori what our thoughts are in our own case. It has been argued that these two theses are incompatible. I invoke a particular metaphysics of belief that has been used to defend a thesis in philosophy of language called "Millianism". I argue that this metaphysics of belief can be used to help solve the apparent incompatibility of Content Externalism and Privileged Access. I then discuss the implications of my solution for epistemology.

NOTE: This paper was recently accepted for presentation at the Pacific APA 2005 (San Francisco, CA). The version above is much longer. [Click here] for the shorter APA version.