

Generic Expansiveness of the Majority Top Cycle

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June 20, 2008

Seminal Papers

McKelvey (1976, 1979)

- ▶ Fixes preference profile, assumes preference diversity.
- ▶ Early paper uses strong assumptions.
- ▶ Later paper gives strong necessary conditions on frontier of top cycle.
- ▶ General, but complex and a little ambiguous.

Schofield (1978, 1983)

- ▶ Early paper gives conditions for local cycles.
- ▶ Later paper shows local cycles are dense for a residual set of utility profiles when $d \geq 3$.
- ▶ Adding a dimension, $TC = X$ for a residual set of utility profiles.

This Paper

- ▶ Simple statement of genericity result in terms of finite-dimensional perturbations.
- ▶ Perturbations preserve nice properties, like concavity.
- ▶ Proof establishes genericity of McKelvey's preference diversity (clarifies connection to Austen-Smith and Banks')
- ▶ Saves a dimension. (I use a "global indifference lemma" due to McKelvey to get an extra restriction.)
- ▶ Understandable to undergrads. . .

Social Choice Framework

X set of alternatives, open and connected in \mathbb{R}^d

N set of n agents, n odd, $n \geq 3$

P_i strict preference relation for i

I_i indifference relation for i

u_i smooth utility representation for i

s^i linear preference perturbation for i

Social Choice Framework (cont.)

- ▶ Preferences at $s = (s^1, \dots, s^n)$ are given by

$$U_i(x, s) = u_i(x) + s^i \cdot x.$$

- ▶ We use $P_i(s)$, $I_i(s)$, $P_i(x, s)$, $I_i(x, s)$ in the predictable way.
- ▶ Strict majority preference at s :

$$xP(s)y \quad \text{iff} \quad |\{i \mid xP_i(s)y\}| > \frac{n}{2}$$

- ▶ Majority core at s :

$$K(s) = \{x \mid \text{there is no } y \text{ s.t. } yP(s)x\}$$

Top Cycle Theorem

- ▶ Majority top cycle at s :

$$TC(s) = \left\{ x \mid \begin{array}{l} \text{for all } y, \text{ there are } x_1, \dots, x_m \text{ s.t.} \\ xP(s)x_1P(s)\cdots x_{m-1}P(s)x_m = y \end{array} \right\}$$



- ▶ **Global Cycle Theorem:** Assume $d \geq 3$. Then for almost all s , the top cycle at s equals X .

Pareto Manifolds

- **Pareto Manifold Lemma 1:** For almost all s and for all coalitions C with $|C| \leq d + 1$, the set


$$M_C(s) = \left\{ x \mid \text{rank}\{Du_i(x) + s^i \mid i \in C\} = |C| - 1 \right\}$$

is a $(|C| - 1)$ -dimensional manifold.



Pareto Manifolds (cont.)

- ▶ **Pareto Manifold Lemma 2:** For almost all s and all non-nested C, C' with $\max\{|C|, |C'|\} \leq d + 1$, the set $M_C(s) \cap M_{C'}(s)$ is a manifold of dimension $|C| + |C'| - d - 2$.
- ▶ For example, if $|C| = |C'| = 3$, then the intersection has dimension $3 + 3 - d - 2 = 4 - d \leq 1$.



Preference Diversity

- ▶ **Weak preference diversity at s :** For all x and all distinct i, j such that $Du_i(x) + s^i \neq 0$, the set $I_i(x, s) \cap I_j(x, s)$ has empty interior in $I_i(x, s)$.
- ▶ The **frontier** of a set Y is

$$\text{fr}Y = \text{clos}(\text{int}Y) \cap \text{clos}(\text{int}\bar{Y}).$$

- ▶ **Strong preference diversity at s :** For all Y , all $x \in \text{fr}Y$, and all distinct i, j , the set $I_i(x, s) \cap I_j(x, s)$ has empty interior in $\text{fr}Y$.

$$\text{generic } s \Rightarrow \begin{array}{c} \text{weak pref.} \\ \text{diversity} \end{array} \Rightarrow \begin{array}{c} \text{strong pref.} \\ \text{diversity} \end{array}$$

Constrained Symmetry

- ▶ Let $T(x, s)$ be the alternatives that directly or indirectly dominate x , i.e.,

$$T(x, s) = \left\{ y \mid \text{there are } x_1, \dots, x_m \text{ such that } yP(s)x_1P(s)\cdots x_{m-1}P(s)x_m = x \right\}.$$

- ▶ **Global Indifference Lemma:** For almost all s and for all x , there is some agent k such that u_k is constant on $\text{fr}T(x, s)$, i.e., for some y , we have $\text{fr}T(x, s) \subseteq I_k(y, s)$.

Constrained Symmetry (cont.)



- ▶ **Constrained Symmetry Theorem:** Assume $d \geq 3$. For generic s , let k be indifferent on $\text{fr}T(x, s)$. Then constrained symmetry holds at all $y \in \text{fr}T(x, s)$, i.e., there is a partition $\{J_1, \dots, J_m\}$ of $N \setminus \{k\}$ such that for all $J_\ell = \{i, j\}$, we have

$$Du_k(y) + s^k \in \text{span}\{Du_i(y) + s^i, Du_j(y) + s^j\}.$$

- ▶ An implication is that

$$\text{fr}T(x, s) \subseteq \bigcup_{\substack{C: |C|=1,2,3 \\ k \in C}} M_C(s).$$

Constrained Symmetry (cont.)




Idea of Proof

- ▶ It suffices to show that $X \subseteq \text{clos} T(x, s)$ for all x , so suppose $X \setminus \text{clos} T(\tilde{x}, s)$ is nonempty.
- ▶ We can show that there are agents i and j and an open set Z such that:
 - (i) $Z \cap \text{fr} T(\tilde{x}, s) \subseteq M_{\{i,j,k\}}(s)$
 - (ii) $Z \cap \text{fr} T(\tilde{x}, s) = Z \cap I_k(x, s)$.
- ▶ But $M_{\{i,j,k\}}(s)$ is a lower dimensional set that intersects $I_k(x, s)$ transversally...

Idea of Proof (cont.)



- ▶ A side view:



- ▶ So $M_{\{i,j,k\}}(s) \cap I_k(x, s)$ has dimension less than or equal to $d - 2$, and we cannot have $Z \cap I_k(x, s) \subseteq M_{\{i,j,k\}}(s)$, a contradiction.

Finite Shyness

- ▶ Let X be a completely metrizable tvs and $C \subseteq X$ a convex subset. Then a Borel set $E \subseteq C$ is **finitely shy** in C if there is a finite-dimensional subspace $V \subseteq C$ such that $\lambda_{V+x}(C) > 0$ for some $x \in X$ and $\lambda_{V+y}(E) > 0$ for every $y \in X$.



Finite Shyness (cont.)

- ▶ Map Anderson and Zame (2001) to our framework:
 - X n -fold product space of smooth functions on \mathbb{R}^d
 - E space of (u_1, \dots, u_n) with top cycle not equal to X
 - V n -fold product space of linear functions on \mathbb{R}^d
- ▶ **Global Cycle Corollary 1:** The space of utility profiles for which the top cycle is not equal to X is finitely shy in the space of smooth profiles.
- ▶ **Global Cycle Corollary 2:** The space of utility profiles for which the top cycle is not equal to X is finitely shy in the space of smooth, concave profiles.

Extras

- ▶ The results just need an extra dimension if X is a differentiable manifold with boundary.
- ▶ Suppose the set of alternatives is any set $X' \subseteq \mathbb{R}^d$. Then the theorem holds for any open, connected subset $X \subseteq X'$, giving us arbitrarily tight cycles around any pre-specified path through X' .
- ▶ The n even case presents different challenges. Expansiveness of the top cycle is generic as long as $d \geq 4$ and $n \geq 6$.