John E. Stovall
Ph.D. Candidate, University of Rochester, Department of Economics
Email: jstovall "at" mail.rochester.edu
Microeconomic Theory, Decision Theory, Social Choice
Multiple Temptations - 9 November 2009
Forthcoming in Econometrica
Abstract - We use a preference-over-menus framework to model a decision maker who is affected by multiple temptations. Our two main axioms on preference, Exclusion and Inclusion, identify when the agent would want to restrict his choice set and when he would want to expand his choice set. An agent who is tempted would want to restrict his choice set by excluding the normatively worst alternative of that choice set. Simultaneously, he would want to expand his choice set by including a normatively superior alternative. Our representation identifies the agent's normative preference and temptations, and suggests the agent is uncertain which of these temptations will affect him. We provide examples to illustrate how our model improves on those of Gul and Pesendorfer (2001) and Dekel, Lipman, and Rustichini (2009).
Note - An older version of this paper was previously distributed under the title
Temptation and Self-Control as Duals (7 November 2008).
Asymmetric Parametric Division Rules - 11 September 2009
Abstract - We describe and characterize the family of asymmetric parametric division rules for the adjudication of conflicting claims. We take two approaches in characterizing this family. The first approach follows the existing literature in defining a claims problem. As part of the characterization in this setting, we present two novel axioms, Intrapersonal Consistency and Priority Continuity, which restrict how a division rule indirectly allocates between different versions of the same claimant. The second approach departs from the existing literature by expanding the definition of a claims problem to allow claimants to have multiple claims. The characterization in this setting uses the same set of axioms, though modified for this expanded domain, used by Young (1987) to characterize the family of (symmetric) parametric division rules. We show that these two approaches are essentially equivalent.
Back to the UR Economics Department