• Electoral Systems and Real Prices: Panel Evidence for the OECD Countries 1970-2000. With Eric C.C. Chang and Ronald Rogowski. British Journal of Political Science. Forthcoming. Abstract :: pdf




• How Domestic Is Domestic Politics? Globalization and Elections. Annual Review of Political Science 10: 341-62. 2007. Abstract :: pdf




• Trade and the Timing of Elections. British Journal of Political Science 36(3): 437-57. 2006. Abstract :: pdf




• Who Surfs, Who Manipulates? The Determinants of Opportunistic Election Timing and Electorally Motivated Economic Intervention. American Political Science Review 99(1): 17-28. 2005. Abstract :: pdf




• Majoritarian Electoral Systems and Consumer Power: Price-Level Evidence from the OECD Countries. With Ronald Rogowski. American Journal of Political Science 46(3): 526-39. 2002. Abstract :: pdf  :: data




• Performance Pressure: Partisanship and the Economic Vote. With Christopher Wlezien. [November 2007].  Revise & Resubmit, JOP. Abstract :: pdf




• Partisan Waves: International Sources of Electoral Choice. [January 2008].   Revise & Resubmit, AJPS. Abstract :: pdf




• Counting Calories: Democracy and Redistribution in the Developing World. With Lisa Blaydes. [August 2007]. Abstract :: pdf




• Electoral Competitiveness: Toward a Universal Measure. With Drew Linzer. [April 2007]. Abstract :: pdf




• Majoritarian Hawks, Proportional Doves: Electoral Institutions, Coalitions and Conflict. With Taehee Whang. [In Process].
  

Electoral Systems and the Balance of Consumer-Producer Power. With Ronald Rogowski, Eric C.C. Chang and Drew Linzer. Investigates the effects of electoral systems on the relative influence of various interests within society. Rogowski & Kayser’s (2002) extension of the classic Stigler-Peltzman model of regulation to include explicit electoral institutions implies that majoritarian electoral arrangements should empower consumers relative to producers. This manuscript, employing real price levels as a proxy for consumer power, rigorously establishes this proposition over time, within the OECD, and across a large sample of developing countries. Majoritarian electoral arrangements depress real prices by approximately ten percent, all else equal. Additional theoretical implications about institutional reform and electoral competitiveness are also developed.


Interdependence and Elections: The International Economy and Electoral Politics.
Examines how international integration influences domestic politics and elections. Considerable research has focused on how economic integration may constrain domestic policy making yet we know very little about effects on domestic political processes per se. This manuscript remedies this omission by systematically investigating (1) how international business cycles affect domestic election timing, (2) how opportunistic election timing trades off against politically motivated economic manipulation in economically globalized states, (3) how expected negative election outcomes in other countries invite pre-emptive election calling, (4) how voters in open economies hold government accountable for economic performance, and (5) how international co-movements in macroeconomic aggregates influence partisan waves in government.